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STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
On February 23, 2017, an approximately 2-acre property north of Idaho Falls located at 
1623 W. 145 N., Idaho Falls, Idaho (hereafter ''Property"), was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure 
sale. The buyer at that sale was Mohamed Elabed (hereinafter "Mr. Elabed" or "Elabed"). The 
deeded owner, Darin Bergeman (hereafter "Mr. Bergeman" or "Bergeman"), filed this action 
seeking to overturn that sale. Mr. Elabed, later joined by Defendant Select Portfolio Servicing, 
LLC (hereafter "SPS"), moved to dismiss Bergeman' s initial, amended and second amended 
complaints under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Mr. Bergeman also sought to 
consolidate this action with an eviction action brought by Mr. Elabed. Both of the 12(b)(6) 
motions were granted by the Honorable Judge Bruce L. Pickett (hereafter "District Court") on 
June 5, 2017. (R. 103-112). He also denied the Bergeman's Motion to Consolidate. (R. 98-101). 
This appeal by Mr. Bergeman attempts to overturn both decisions by the District Court. Yet, Mr. 
Bergeman failed to engage the arguments before the District Court and has now failed to do so 
before this Court in his opening brief. Accordingly, the District Court's decisions should stand. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The Course of Proceedings provided by Mr. Bergeman is incomplete. 
On March 9, 2017, Mr. Bergeman filed his initial Complaint. (R., pp. 7-35)1• 
1 The Clerk's Record on Appeal will be cited as "R." The Supplemental Record on 
Appeal will be cited as "Supp. R." The Reporter's Transcript is of the Hearing on Motions held 
May 18, 2017 will be cited as "Tr." 
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On March 27, 2017, Mr. Elabed filed a Verified Complaint for Eviction directed at the 
then occupant of the Property, Leslie Billman. (Supp. R., pp. 13-19). 
On April 10, 2017, Mr. Bergeman filed his Amended Complaint. (R., pp. 67-95). He also 
simultaneously filed a Motion to Consolidate and Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Consolidate this action and Mr. Elabed's eviction action. (Supp. R., pp. 1-3 and Supp. R, pp. 4-
12). 
On April 12, 2017, Mr. Elabed filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) (Supp. R., pp. 60-66) and an Objection to Motion to Consolidate. 
(Supp. R., pp. 67-83). 
On April 21, 2017, Mr. Bergeman filed his [Second] Amended Complaint. (R., pp. 36-
66). 
On April 26, 2017, SPS filed Select Portfolio Servicing's Motion to Dismiss. (Supp. R., 
pp. 93-94) and a Memorandum in Support of Select Portfolio Servicing's Motion to Dismiss 
(Supp. R., 96-113). These documents were accompanied by a Declaration of Elijah M. Watkins 
in Support of Defendant Select Portfolio Servicing's Motion to Dismiss. (Supp. R., pp. 114-
125). 
On April 27, 2017, Mr. Bergeman filed an Objection to Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
(Supp. R., 91-92) and a Memorandum in Support of Objection to Motion to Dismiss (Supp. R., 
pp. 84-90) directed at Mr. Elabed's April 12, 2017 Motion to Dismiss. 
On May 1, 2017, Mr. Bergeman filed an Objection to Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
directed at the Elabed motion to dismiss. (Supp. R., pp. 133-134). That same day he also filed 
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another Memorandum in Support of Objection to Motion to Dismiss. (Supp. R., pp. 126-132). 
Bergeman also that day filed an Objection to Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Vacate. (Supp. 
R., pp. 135-136). That document was accompanied by an Affidavit of Robert K. Beck. (Supp. 
R., pp. 137-139). 
On May 2, 2017, Elabed's filed his Response to Objection to Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion to Vacate filed by Plaintiff and Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) with Respect to Defendant Mohamed Elabed. (Supp. R., 140-147). 
On May 4, 2017, SPS filed Defendant Select Portfolio Servicing's response to Plaintiffs 
Objection to Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Vacate. (Supp. R., pp. 148-151 ). 
On May 10, 2017, Bergeman filed an Objection to Rule l 2(b )( 6) Motion to Dismiss 
(Supp. R., pp. 170-71) and Memorandum in Support of Objection to Second Motion to Dismiss 
(Supp. R., pp. 172-80). 
On May 17, 2018, SPS filed a Reply in Support of Select Portfolio Servicing's Motion to 
Dismiss. (Supp. R., pp. 181-93). 
Oral argument on the Motions to Dismiss of both Elabed and Select Portfolio Servicing 
and Mr. Bergeman's Motion to Consolidate were held on May 18, 2017. (Tr., LL 1:1-53:3). 
The Court on June 5, 2017 issued a pair of written decisions granting both the Motions to 
Dismiss (R., pp. 103-112) and denying the Motion to Consolidate (R., pp. 98-101 ). The District 
Court also filed simultaneously a Judgment of Dismissal. (R., pp. 96-97). 
On June 12, 2017, Bergeman filed a Motion to Reconsider (Supp. R., pp. 194-95). 
Bergeman later withdrew the Motion to Reconsider (Supp. R., 196-97). 
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On July 13, 2017, Bergeman filed this Notice of Appeal. (R., pp. 117-119). 
On September 24, 2017, the District Court entered a Judgment, dismissing the case with 
prejudice. (R., p. 120). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
These are the directly relevant facts as alleged by Mr. Bergeman in his [Second] 
Amended Complaint: 
1. Mr. Bergeman's mother owned the property at issue. (R., p. 48). 
2. Mr. Bergeman's mother was the party named on the loan on the property (R., p. 
39, 1,r 12-13). 
3. That loan was serviced during the relevant time period by SPS. (R., p. 61 - a 
better copy is located at R., p. 29). 
4. Mr. Bergeman's mother died and the Property was deeded to him. (R., p. 36, ,r 1). 
5. The loan SPS serviced was never transferred from Mr. Bergeman's mother's 
name to Mr. Bergeman's. (R., p. 39, 1 13). 
6. Mr. Bergeman was incarcerated in July of 2015. (R., p. 39,, 12). 
7. The loan on the Property went into default. (R., p. 55-57). 
8. The amount due by March 1, 2017 to bring the loan current was $17,932.87. (R., 
p. 61 - a better copy is located at R., p. 29). 
9. Mr. Bergeman, through his father, only paid SPS $16,000 before February 23, 
2017. (R., p. 41, 1 16(c)). 
10. The Property was foreclosed upon on February 23, 2017. (R., p. 41, ,r 16(e)). 
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And, the District Court specified the following with regards to Mr. Elabed's role in its 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate: 
11. Mr. Elabed was the purchaser of the Property at the foreclosure sale held on 
February 23, 2017. (R., p. 98). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in dismissing the Second Amended Complaint pursuant 
to 1.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)? 
2. Did the District Court err in denying the Motion to Consolidate pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 42(a) after dismissing this action? 
3. Is Mr. Elabed entitled to his attorney fees and costs for this appeal pursuant to 
Idaho App. R. 40(a) and 4l(a) and Idaho Code§ 12-121? 
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 
I. Applicable Standards of Review. 
A. For Motion to Dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
With respect to the validity of a district court's determination with respect to a motion to 
dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the appropriate standard of review is: 
When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
l 2(b )( 6) we apply the same standard of review we apply to a motion for summary 
judgment. After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the 
non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated. 
The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party 
is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. 
Joki v. State, 162 Idaho 5, 8, 394 P .3d 48, 51 (2017) ( quoting Coalition for Agriculture's Future 
v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho 142, 145, 369 P.3d 920, 923 (2016)) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). "In addition, this Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary 
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judgment de novo, and this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the 
trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Id. 
"A l 2(b )( 6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief 
has been stated." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). 
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed 
factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief 
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of cause of 
action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-5, 
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) citing Papason v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 
209 (1986). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level." Id 
"[A] court can dismiss an action under Rule 12(b)(6) if it considers only the complaint, 
despite whether a party has submitted additional materials to the record." Paslay v. A&B 
Irrigation Dist., 162 Idaho 866, 406 P.3d 878, 882 (Idaho, 2017) citing Stewart v. Arrington 
Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526,531,446 P.2d 895, 900 (1968). 
B. Motion to Consolidate under I.R.C.P. 42(a) 
I.R.C.P. 42(a) provides "[i]f actions before the court involve a common question 
of law or fact, the court may ... [order consolidation]. (emphasis added). Consolidation is a 
discretionary determination. Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet and Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 299, 859 
P.2d 330, 335 (Idaho, 1993) citing Branom v. Smith Frozen Foods of Idaho, Inc., 83 Idaho 502, 
365 P.2d 958 (1961). "These decisions are committed to the trial court's sound discretion." Wing 
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v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 908, 684 P.2d 307, 310 (Idaho App., 1984), rev'd 
other grounds, citing Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982) and Branom, 83 Idaho 
502, 365 P.2d 958 (1961). 
"To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court considers: (1) 
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Wash. Fed v. Hulsey, 162 Idaho 742, 405 P.3d 1, 8 (Idaho, 
2017) citing Nampa Charter School, Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23, 29, 89 P.3d 863, 869 
(2004). 
II. Bergeman had ample opportunity to present his case to the District Court in 
that he filed three versions of his complaint and never asked to amend again 
after the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion was granted. 
In Idaho the right of a plaintiff to amend his or her complaint is limited. I.R.C.P. 15(a) 
states "a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served .... " I.R.C.P. 15(a). Once an answer has been filed, however, "a 
party may amend a pleading only by leave of court .... " Id. 
Amendments can be denied for "repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment 
previously allowed". Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305 
(1977) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222, 226 
(1962)). 
Here, Bergeman had three chances to amend his complaint to provide facts that would 
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support his causes of action. He failed to do so. 
And, in fact, he failed after dismissal, to ask the Court to amend his complaint yet again. 
(R., pp. 2-6). 
claims. 
Mr. Bergeman has had his day in court and simply fell short of setting forth viable 
III. Bergeman's opening brief almost completely ignored the District Court's 
12(b)(6) decision. 
The key point in this appeal is that Mr. Bergeman has never seriously contested the points 
made by District Court with respect to its I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) decision. In fact, Mr. Bergeman's 
opening brief ignores all of the reasoning and determinations of the District Court with respect to 
Elabed and SPS motions to dismiss. Bergeman Br., pp. 16-20. That is fatal as "issues on appeal 
are not considered unless they are properly supported by both authority and argument." HF.L.P., 
LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 686, 339 P.3d 557, 571 (2014). And, "[t]his Court has 
often stated: 'We will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and authority 
in the opening brief." Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 380 P.3d 168, 174 (Idaho, 2016) 
. citing Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). 
Here, by failing to engage either by argument or by authority any of the District Court's 
reasoning on the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) issues, Bergeman's tangential and unrelated arguments still do 
not undermine the District Court's determination of the following issues. 
A. District Court's determination that Mr. Elabed and SPS were agents 
of each other. 
The District Court assumed that Elabed and SPS were "agents" of each for purposes of 
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I.R.C.P. l 2(b )( 6) in that Bergeman has made such claim in his [Second] Amended Complaint. If 
the matter had proceeded Mr. Elabed would have strongly contested this claim as not a single 
fact links Mr. Elabed in anyway to SPS except he purchased the Property at a foreclosure sale. 
But, this point, did not matter, as to the validity of Bergeman's claims as discussed below. 
B. Count I - Misrepresentation 
The District Court decision provides the nine elements of fraud i.e. intentional 
misrepresentation and then points out that the [Second] Amended Complaint fails to plead facts 
that deal with the following required elements of fraud: 
• Elabed or SPS' knowledge of the alleged statement's falsity (R., p. 106). 
• That the Elabed or SPS intended for Bergeman to rely on any 
misrepresentation (Id.) 
• Bergeman's right to rely on that statement (Id) 
• How Bergeman was injured by the alleged misstatement (Id) 
The District Court then stated that G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 518, 
808 P.2d 851, 855 (1991) establishes that each element must be pied with particularity. These 
are independent grounds for dismissing the [Second] Amended Complaint under I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6). And, as noted above, Bergeman's opening brief failed to engage any of these points. 
(Bergeman Br., pp. 16-20). 
C. Count I - Negligent Misrepresentation 
As the District Court points out, for Bergeman to make such a claim he would need to 
identify a recognized legal duty that exists between himself and SPS and/or Elabed. (R., pp. 106-
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107). He failed to do so in his [Second] Amended Complaint. Id. This is a mandatory 
requirement under Idaho law. Poda/an v. Idaho Legal Aid Servs. Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 946, 854 
P.2d 280, 289 (Ct. App. 1993). Again, in his opening brief Bergman fails to engage this point at 
all. (Bergeman Br., pp. 16-20). 
D. Count II - Trespass 
As the District Court noted, to sustain a claim of trespass Bergman needed to show either 
actual possession or constructive possession of the property at issue. See R., pp. 107-108. Actual 
possession requires a party to hold legal title. Mueller v. Hill, 158 Idaho 208, 212-13, 345 P.3d 
998, 1002-03 (2015), reh'g denied (Apr. 13, 2015). But, Bergeman pied that the property had 
been foreclosed, terminating any interest he might hold. (R., p. 41, ,r 16(e)). As to constructive 
possession, such requires "the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, 
for twenty (20) years". Idaho Code§ 5-206. Here, Bergeman could only have held the property 
"adversely" in the period between the foreclosure sale (February 23, 2017) and the filing of the 
action (March 9, 2017). Thus, the District Court was correct in determining that Bergeman could 
not sustain an action for trespass. Again, Bergeman' s opening brief fails to engage these points. 
(Bergeman Br., pp. 16-20). 
E. Count II - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The District Court notes, correctly, that none of Bergeman' s allegations amount to 
"extreme" or "outrageous conduct", providing a detailed analysis of the Idaho law on this point. 
(R., pp. 109-110). Still again, in his opening brief, Bergeman fails to engage this point. 
(Bergeman Br., pp. 16-20). 
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F. Count II- Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
To make out this claim, under clear Idaho law, a plaintiff must show a legal duty and 
physical injury. As the District Court ruled, Bergeman failed to do either. (R., pp. 110-111 ). In 
his opening brief, Bergeman fails to mention this point at all. (Bergeman Br., pp. 16-20). 
G. There was no Count III and Count IV simply requested attorney fees. 
Bergeman's [Second] Amended Complaint omitted any Count III. (R., p. 44). Count IV 
is a request for attorney fees. (R., pp. 44-45). 
IV. Before the District Court Bergeman also completely failed to engage any of 
the substantive arguments against his complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
At the District Court, Bergeman was confronted repeatedly with substantive arguments as 
to why his complaints fell short. And, in each and every case, he failed to substantively engage 
any of the legal arguments or point out how his alleged facts met the required legal standards. 
On April 12, 2017, Mr. Elabed filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
with Respect to Defendant Mohamed Elabed. (Supp. R, pp. 60-66). That motion pointed out: 
• Bergeman had failed to plead the required Idaho elements of trespass (Supp. 
R., p. 62, 11 5-7). 
• Bergeman had failed to plead intentional infliction of emotion distress, in 
particular the requirement that "defendant's conduct was extreme and 
outrageous" and the only identified conduct by Mr. Elabed is that he has filed 
an eviction complaint. Further, pleading such requires a showing of physical 
injury which is completely lacking (Supp. R., pp. 62-65, 118-13). 
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• None of the elements for negligent infliction of emotional distress were pied 
by Bergeman (Supp. R., p. 65, ,r,r 14-16). 
On April 27, 2017, Bergeman filed a Memorandum in Support of Objection to Motion to 
Dismiss. (Supp. R., pp. 84-90). Not one of the above points was addressed. Id. 
On April 27, 2017, SPS filed its Memorandum in Support of Select Portfolio Servicing' s 
Motion to Dismiss. (Supp. R., pp. 96-113). This pleading pointed out the shortcomings of each 
of the counts contained in Bergeman' s [Second] Amended Complaint. 
On May 2, 2017, Mr. Elabed filed his Response to Objection to Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion to Vacate filed by Plaintiff and Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) with respect to Defendant Mohamed Elabed. (Supp. R., pp. 140-147). This took 
into account the slight modifications contained in the [Second] Amended Complaint. That 
Memorandum pointed out the failure of the trespass claim and outlined Idaho law on wrongful 
foreclosure, namely that the remedy was for monetary damages not return of the property. See 
Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, 160 Idaho 181, 370 P.3d 384, 392-93 (Idaho, 2016); Nora v. Safeco 
Ins. Co., 99 Idaho 60, 65, 577 P.2d 347, 352 (Idaho, l 978)(McFadden, dissenting) (4'ln the 
classical trover action ( conversion), the plaintiff seeks a forced sale of an item of personality to 
the defendant who has wrongfully taken or detained it. His damages are limited to the value of 
the item at the time of conversion plus interest. 3 Blackstone Comm. 153 (2 1st ed. 1844 ); 4 
Sutherland on Damages, supra, § 1109 at 4209."); Hossner v. Idaho Forest Product Industries, 
Inc., 122 Idaho 413, 416, 835 P.2d 648, 651 (Idaho, 1992) (monetary damages for conversion of 
timber); Carpenter v. Turrell, 48 Idaho 645, 651-52, 227 P.3d 575, 581-82 (Idaho, 2000) 
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(monetary damages for conversion of portable building); Roell v. Boise City, 134 Idaho 214, 
216-17, 999 P .2d 251, 253-54 (Idaho, 2000) (award of monetary damages for personal property 
taken). 
Bergeman failed to file any reply to the above. (R., pp. 2-6). 
At the oral argument on May 18, 2017, counsel for Elabed laid out many of the same 
arguments. (Tr., LL 13:15- 20:5; 29:1-30:8). Yet, again, Mr. Bergeman's counsel failed to 
substantively engage any of these points. (Tr., LL 20:7-28:24). Unsurprisingly, the District 
Court, on that record, granted the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions. 
The same pattern is being followed before this Court. Mr. Bergeman focuses in his 
opening brief on alleged wrongdoing but utterly failed to engage the substantive points that his 
own complaint failed to meet, therefore invoking I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). The proper response, now, is 
to do as the District Court did and uphold the District Court's dismissal of this action. 
V. The District Court was correct in determining that the [Second) Amended 
Complaint failed to undermine the validity of the foreclosure sale. 
The only dismissed count of the [Second] Amended Complaint that Bergeman, to some 
degree, engages in his opening brief is Count One, which makes two assertions: 1) That SPS 
engaged in misrepresentation and 2) SPS engaged in negligent supervision. As noted supra, 
Bergeman failed to engage key decision points made by the District Court. But, even if 
Bergeman' s arguments were accepted by this Court, they still do not justify overturning the 
District Court decision. 
First, with respect to the claim of misrepresentation and/or negligent supervision, 
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Bergeman argues that the District Court engaged in a "poor effort" and that "SPS was quite 
successful in persuading the District Court to focus on the relationship between SPS and Mr. 
Elabed". (Bergeman Br., p. 17). Last, but not least, he suggests that "[p]erhaps that District 
Court saw that this case was one that would be very complex and difficult to manage - resulting 
in a an effort to manage this case by virtue of ordering its dismissal." Id. He even suggests this 
Court might be "obtuse". (Bergeman Br., p. 19). 
Of note, Bergeman fails completely to cite to anywhere in the record and fails to point to 
any form of authority supporting his position. (Bergeman Br., pp. 16-20). He does assert that, if 
discovery is allowed to go forward, he will find something, somewhere to back up his claims. 
But, the facts pied by Mr. Bergeman in his [Second] Amended Complaint support the 
District Court decision. First, he admitted that there was default on the loan. (R., p. 39, 1 12). 
Second, he points to a statement from SPS that shows the default just before the foreclosure sale 
is $17,932.87. (R., p. 61 - a better copy is located at R., p. 29). Then, he pied that he only paid 
$16,000, not the necessary $17,932.87, to cure the default before the foreclosure sale was 
conducted. (R., p. 41, 116(c)). 
None of that is legally relevant in that Idaho Code provides a cure period for a deed of 
trust for only 115 days. See Idaho Code § 45-1506(12). Yet, Bergeman never pied that he 
"cured" the default in the 115-day period. Instead he claims he made a large payment at some 
undetermined time. (R. p. 41, 1 16(t)). But, as noted above, he specifically stated that he only 
paid $16,000 before the foreclosure sale. 
The District Court's decision was sound. 
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VI. The District Court's determination on consolidation was correct. 
The District Court exercised its discretion under I.R.C.P. 42(a) and denied Bergeman's 
Motion to Consolidate. 
The District Court cited to I.R.C.P. 42(a), including its ''may" language as the appropriate 
framework for analysis. 
The District Court then determined that there was not an overlap as to matters of law, 
pointing out the different claims of each complaint: 
Foreclosure Complaint Eviction Action 
Misrepresentation Tenancy and Eviction Proceedings under I.C. 
Negligent Supervision 6-310 and I.C. 45-1506(11). 
Trespass 
Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
(R., pp. 99-100). 
The District Court also determined that there was no overlap of fact. (R., p. 100). 
Before this Court, Mr. Bergeman has failed to engage the District Court's analysis at all. 
(Bergeman Br., p. 20). This failure, as noted supra, is fatal in that failure to provide substantive 
analysis resolves the issue - in this case upholding the District Court's determination. 
Instead, his opening brief impugns the integrity of the District Court ("It is not hard to 
conclude that the District Court was more focused on the headache presented to it . . .It would 
appear that this poor decision by the District Court was motivated by an intense desire to avoid 
the headache of presiding over a case it did not properly perceive." (Id.). 
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There is a final basis for upholding the District's decision on this issue. If this Court 
upholds the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, there is simply no action to consolidate with the eviction 
matter (which itself has since been resolved). See, generally, Bonneville County Case No. CV-
17-1746. 
VII. The Court should only consider items actually in the record. 
Mr. Bergeman's opening brief is replete with multiple allegations and statements 
that are simply not part of the record before this Court. In fact, that brief lacks any citation to the 
record whatsoever. (Bergeman's Br., generally). 
This is an independent basis for denying his appeal. His failure is a violation of the 
substance and spirit of l.A.R. 28 and I.A.R. 35(e). And, Bergeman's failure to cite is not resolved 
if items were not included in the record. "It is an appellant's duty to furnish the record upon 
which his assertions can be examined." Reeves v. State, 673 P.2d 444, 446, 105 Idaho 844, 846 
(Idaho App., 1983) citing State v. Wolf, 102 Idaho 789, 640 P.2d 1190 (Ct. App. 1982). 
This Court has previously declined to review arguments unsupported by either citations 
to the record or relevant legal authority. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 220 P .3d 580, 586 
(Idaho, 2009). All unsupported statements without record citations should be completely 
disregarded. 
VIII. Bergeman is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal while Elabed should be 
awarded both attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Bergeman argues he is entitled to attorney fees but fails to provide any legal basis for 
such. (Bergeman Br., pg. 10). "We have repeatedly held that we will not consider a request for 
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attorney fees on appeal that is not supported by legal authority or argument." Bagley v. 
Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 241 P.3d 972, 977 (Idaho, 2010) citing Bream v. Benscoter, 139 
Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). Bergeman should be denied attorney fees on appeal. 
In contrast, Elabed believes he is entitled to attorney fees for this appeal pursuant to 
I.A.R. 41(a) through application of Idaho Code § 12-121 in that this case was "brought 
fri volously, unreasonably or without foundation." Idaho Code § 12-121. " In normal 
circumstances, attorney fees will only be awarded under that statute when this court is left with 
the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation." Renshaw v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. , Inc., 155 Idaho 656, 315 P.3d 
844 (Idaho, 2013) citing Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc. , 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 
1078, 1085 (1979). In that Bergeman has failed completely to engage on the merits such an 
award here is justified. 
Also, if Elabed prevails in this action, he is also entitled to his costs under I.A.R. 40(a). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court on the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
issues and its denial of request for consolidation under I.R.C.P. 42(a). And, given the lack of 
legal or factual engagement, Elabed is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DA TED this ( lf f~ day of May, 2018. 
MAYNESTAGGARTPLLC 
§teven L. Taggart 
Attorney for Respondent MOHAMED ELABED 
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